The Setting

The act of referring to objects, so effortlessly performed in everyday discourse, belies the complex web of philosophical inquiry it has spurred since the dawn of analytic philosophy. In the annals of this intellectual tradition, a recurring motif emerges: the relentless quest to mend the perceived fractures in the relationship between words and the world they represent. As the century unfolded, a dichotomy crystallized within the realm of linguistic philosophy. On one side stood the cognitivists, disciples of Chomsky, who espoused the view of language as an internal computational apparatus for thought. According to Chomsky’s doctrine, language itself did not possess inherent reference but served as a conduit for expressing thoughts about the external realm. On the opposing front were the behaviourists, led by Skinner, who conceptualized language as verbal behavior moulded by environmental contingencies. Skinner’s contention that the traditional notion of reference was dispensable gave rise to the notion of the “tact,” a verbal operant subject to control by non-verbal stimuli and shaped by the three-term contingency.

Despite their discordant philosophies, both camps found common ground in their dismissal of the reference relation as dissected by analytic philosophers. This scepticism toward linguistic philosophy’s pursuits of clarity and repair continues. But work over the last half a century has laid the groundwork for some convergence between analytic philosophy and behavioural science. In this exploration, we delve into the fertile terrain where analytic philosophy and behavioural science intersect, focusing on the burgeoning field of Relational Frame Theory (RFT). Through an examination of the perspectives of Quine and relational frame theorists, we embark on a journey to unravel the intricacies of observation sentences—how they are acquired, developed, and intertwined with our perception of the world. Join us as we navigate the intricate labyrinth of language and cognition, seeking to illuminate the elusive nature of referentiality and its implications for our understanding of the human mind.

              The Evolution of language

In their groundbreaking work, Hayes and Sanford (2014) delve into the evolutionary origins of our verbal behavior, painting a vivid picture of how our linguistic abilities evolved over time. They dissect our communication skills, drawing parallels between humans and other non-verbal creatures, highlighting shared traits such as vocalizations to influence behavior and social referencing. Arguing from the vantage point of group selection, Hayes and Sanford suggest that our cooperative instincts played a pivotal role in shaping our linguistic capacities. They illustrate this through a compelling scenario: two individuals near an apple tree, both equipped with the word “apple.” When one person vocalizes the word and the fruit is out of reach, the other steps in to retrieve it, fostering cooperation and mutual understanding. This cooperative dynamic, they contend, marks the genesis of our ability to engage in a frame of coordination, where words seamlessly align with their referents. Through reinforcement and shared experiences, individuals develop a nuanced understanding of the relationship between sounds and objects, paving the way for combinatorial entailment and the intricate web of relational frames. In essence, Hayes and Sanford propose that our cooperative instincts underpin our capacity to frame and derive meaning from language, ushering in a new era of understanding in the evolutionary origins of human communication.

Once this frame of coordination was acquired humans would then have the capacity to recognize mutuality in a frame. And they argue that repeated application of mutuality would give an organism the ability to use combinatorial entailment (ibid p.123). Thus, on this conception the capacity to relationally frame is created primarily by our cooperative instinct.

   Individual or Shared Behavioural Streams

In the intricate narrative spun by Sanford and Hayes (2014), the spotlight falls on the profound interplay between human cognition and cooperative instincts, casting a revealing light on the evolution of verbal behavior. Central to their thesis is the notion of coordination between words and objects, a feat achieved through social derivation and contextual control over the “is” relation. Illustrating their argument with the allegory of two individuals wielding the word “apple” as a Mand, Sanford and Hayes beckon us into a world where language becomes a conduit for shared experiences and mutual understanding. Yet, lurking beneath the surface lies a critique of individualistic interpretations, epitomized by Barnes-Holmes (2000), who dissected such instances of triangulation within the confines of individual behavioural streams. In this intricate dance of cognition and cooperation, the tale takes a twist as the narrative shifts to the realm of joint attention. Here, the shared object of experience emerges as the linchpin, transcending individual streams and fostering a communal understanding. While behavioural pragmatists grapple with the ontological underpinnings, their reluctance to delve into intersubjective agreement leaves a void in their narrative, one that can only be filled by acknowledging the symbiotic relationship between individual streams and communal experiences. Thus, as the story unfolds, Sanford and Hayes beckon us to embark on a journey through the labyrinth of human cognition, where language and cooperation intertwine to shape our collective understanding of the world.

         Cometh the Hour Cometh the Man

Enter Quine, the philosophical voyager navigating the treacherous waters of linguistic ambiguity and cognitive convergence. Armed with intellect and inquiry, Quine set out to unravel the enigma of shared understanding amidst the cacophony of sensory receptors. In Quine’s labyrinth of inquiry, the conundrum of observation sentences loomed large, casting shadows of doubt upon the very fabric of linguistic communion. While his behavioural contemporaries grappled with the intricacies of Mand and Tact, Quine delved into the depths of epistemological and semantic inquiry, seeking to unveil the secrets of meaning and consensus. Yet, amidst the philosophical fog, parallels emerged between Quine’s quest and the behavioural pragmatists’ plight. Both faced the daunting task of reconciling individual streams of experience with the communal tapestry of cognition, each seeking solace in the embrace of naturalistic explanation. Quine’s solution, an appeal to perceptual harmony and empathetic resonance, stood as a beacon of enlightenment amidst the turbulent seas of inquiry. Through the lens of empathy, Quine discerned the threads of joint attention and social referencing, weaving a tapestry of understanding that transcended individual perspectives. And yet, the tension persisted between Quine’s ontological aspirations and the pragmatists’ yearning for epistemological clarity. As Barnes-Holmes et al. posited the notion of separate behavioural streams, Quine’s empathy-driven paradigm stood as a testament to the interconnectedness of human cognition. In the end, Quine’s journey served as a testament to the intricate dance of intellect and instinct, weaving a narrative of inquiry and insight that continues to resonate across the landscape of philosophical discourse.